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Abstract—A secret key can be used to conceal information
from an eavesdropper during communication, as in Shannon’s
cipher system. Most theoretical guarantees of secrecy require
the secret key space to grow exponentially with the length
of communication. Here we show that when an eavesdropper
attempts to reconstruct an information sequence, as posed in the
literature by Yamamoto, very little secret key is required to effect
unconditionally maximal distortion; specifically, we only need the
secret key space to increase unboundedly, growing arbitrarily
slowly with the blocklength. As a corollary, even with a secret key
of constant size we can still cause the adversary arbitrarily close
to maximal distortion, regardless of the length of the information
sequence.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we consider the Shannon cipher system, first
investigated in [1]. The cipher system is a communication
system with the addition of secret key that the legitimate
parties share and use to encrypt messages. A classic result by
Shannon in [1] states that to achieve perfect secrecy, the size
of the secret key space must be at least the size of the message
space. As in [1], we consider the secrecy resource to be shared
secret key, but we relax the requirement of perfect secrecy
and instead look at the minimum distortion that an adversary
attains when attempting to reproduce the source sequence.
The joint goal of Alice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver) is
to communicate a source sequence almost losslessly while
maximizing the adversary’s minimum attainable distortion. In
contrast to equivocation, a max-min distortion measure pro-
vides guarantees about the way in which any adversary could
use his knowledge; equivocation does not give much insight
into the structure of the knowledge or how the knowledge can
be used.
This measure of security was investigated by Yamamoto
in the general case where distortion is allowed at the legiti-
mate receiver. In [2], Yamamoto established upper and lower
bounds on the tradeoff between the rate of secret key and the
adversary’s distortion.
In this paper, we solve the problem studied in [2], in the
case that almost lossless communication is required. We show
that any positive rate of secret key suffices for Alice and Bob
to cause the adversary unconditionally maximal distortion (i.e.,
the distortion incurred by only knowing the source distribution
and nothing else). A positive rate of secret key R0 means
the number of secret keys is exponential in the blocklength
n, because there are 2nR0 secret keys available. However, if
the secret key space is merely growing unboundedly with n,
we show that the adversary still suffers maximal distortion.
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K
Eve
Xn M Xˆn
Zn
Fig. 1. Alice and Bob share secret key K , which Alice uses along with
her observation of Xn to encode a message M . Secrecy is measured by the
minimum distortion Eve can attain.
We also show that a constant amount of secret key can yield
nontrivial distortion at the adversary.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The system under consideration, shown in Figure 1, operates
on blocks of length n. Alice is given an i.i.d. source sequence
Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) consisting of symbols drawn from a finite
alphabet X according to PX . Alice and Bob share secret key
in the form of a uniform random variable K taking values
in an alphabet K. Eve knows the source distribution and the
operations of Alice and Bob, but does not have access to the
secret key. At the transmitter, Alice sends M ∈ M based
on the source sequence Xn and secret key K; at the other
end, Bob observes M and K and produces a sequence Xˆn.
Eve produces a sequence Zn from M and her knowledge of
the source distribution and system operations (encoder and
decoder).
Definition 1. Let k : N → N. An (n, k(n), R) code consists
of an encoder f and a decoder g:
f : Xn ×K →M
g :M×K → Xn,
where the size of the message set is |M| = 2nR, and the
number of secret keys available is |K| = k(n).
We measure secrecy by the distortion between the source
sequence and an adversary’s estimate of the source sequence.
Given a per-letter distortion measure d : X ×Z → [0,∞), we
define the distortion between two sequences as the average of
the per-letter distortions:
dn(xn, zn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(xi, zi).
Without loss of generality, we assume that for all x ∈ X , there
exists a z ∈ Z such that d(x, z) = 0.
For a given amount of secret key, we are interested in
the rate of communication and the distortion incurred by the
cleverest adversary.
Definition 2. For a given sequence k(n) and measure of
distortion d(x, z), we say that the pair (R,D) is achievable
if there exists a sequence of (n, k(n), R) codes such that
lim
n→∞
P[Xn 6= Xˆn] = 0 (1)
and
lim inf
n→∞
min
zn(m)
E [dn(Xn, zn(M))] ≥ D. (2)
The requirement in (1) is that the probability of commu-
nication error between Alice and Bob vanishes. In (2), the
minimum is taken over all functions zn : M → Zn, i.e., all
possible strategies that Eve can employ. Although not explicit
in the notation, it should be understood that Eve’s strategy is
a function of not only the message M , but also the source
distribution PX and the (n, k(n), R) code.
III. MAIN RESULT
The main result is the following theorem. The restriction on
R, the communication rate, is the same as the classic result for
source coding. Notice that minz E[d(X, z)] is the distortion
between Xn and the constant sequence (z∗, . . . , z∗), where
z∗ = argminzE[d(X, z)].
Theorem 1. Let k(n) be an increasing, unbounded sequence.
Then (R,D) is achievable if and only if 1
R > H(X)
D ≤ min
z
E[d(X, z)].
If we wanted to consider rates of secret key, we would set
k(n) = 2nR0 and define (R,R0, D) to be achievable if there
exists a sequence of codes such that (1) and (2) hold. Then,
by Theorem 1, we would have that (R,R0, D) is achievable
if and only if
R > H(X) R > H(X)
R0 > 0 or R0 = 0
D ≤ min
z
E[d(X, z)] D = 0
This is the solution to the lossless case of the problem posed in
[2]. It should be noted that with the proper choice of auxilliary
random variables, the converse bound on R0 in [2] is actually
the trivial bound, R0 ≥ 0.
With Theorem 1 in hand, we are able to say something about
the usefulness of a finite amount of secret key. The following
corollary asserts that the cleverest adversary suffers close to
maximal distortion even if the number of secret keys stays
constant as blocklength increases.
1For simplicity, we ignore the case R = H(X)
Corollary 1. Fix PX and d(x, z), and denote Dmax =
minz E[d(X, z)]. For all D < Dmax and R > H(X), there
exists k∗ ∈ N such that (R,D) is achievable under k(n) = k∗.
Proof of Corollary 1: Suppose the contrary. That is,
assume there exists D < Dmax or R > H(X) such that
for all k˜ ∈ N, (R,D) is not achievable under k(n) = k˜. If
we denote the minimum attainable distortion for blocklength
n and k˜ secret keys by
dn,k˜ = min
zn(m)
E [dn(Xn, zn(M))] ,
we are asserting that for all (n, k˜, R) codes, either
lim sup
n→∞
P[Xn 6= Xˆn] > 0 (3)
or lim inf
n→∞
dn,k˜ < D. (4)
In particular, all (n, k˜, R) codes not satisfying (3) must satisfy
(4), which implies that for all k˜ ∈ N, the sequence dn,k˜ is
strictly less than D infinitely often. To arrive at a contradiction,
we will define an increasing unbounded sequence kˆ(n) such
that d
n,kˆ(n) is strictly less than D infinitely often. Since
D < Dmax, such a kˆ(n) will imply
lim inf
n→∞
d
n,kˆ(n) < Dmax,
contradicting Theorem 1 and completing the proof. To that
end, first define the increasing sequence {Nℓ} recursively by
N0 = 0
Nℓ = min{n > Nℓ−1 : dn,ℓ < D}.
Then we define kˆ(n) by
kˆ(n) = ℓ if Nℓ−1 < n ≤ Nℓ.
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in the next section,
but first we provide some intuition for why the result holds
by briefly addressing some of the proof ideas. In designing
a code, Alice and Bob can use the secret key K to apply
a one-time pad to part of the message so that the adversary
effectively knows that the source sequence Xn lies in a subset
B ⊂ Xn, but is unsure which sequence the true one is. The
number of sequences in B is |K| = k(n), the number of secret
keys. Under such a scheme, the adversary’s optimal strategy
for minimizing distortion is to output the following symbol on
the ith step:
zi(B) = argminz
∑
xn∈B
p(xn)
P[Xn ∈ B]
d(xi, z) (5)
Note that (5) is the expected value of d(Xi, z) conditioned on
the event {Xn ∈ B}. Now, if each of the sequences in A were
equally likely to be the source sequence, (5) becomes
zi(B) = argminz
∑
xn∈B
1
|B|
d(xi, z)
= argminz
∑
x∈X
Qi(x) d(x, z),
B :
0 0 1 0 0 1 2 2
0 2 0 1 1 2 0 0
1 0 2 2 0 0 1 0
2 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
Fig. 2. Consider PX = { 12 ,
1
4
, 1
4
}, X = {0, 1, 2}, n = 4, and k(4) = 8.
Suppose Eve knows that the source sequence X4 is a column of B, but
does not know which column. Since all the columns are equally likely and
the empirical distribution of each row matches PX , Eve’s best strategy is to
output argmin
z
E[d(X, z)] at each step (see (6)). For example, if the distortion
measure were Hamming distance (i.e., d(x, z) = 1{x 6= z}), then Eve would
output (0, 0, 0, 0).
where Qi(x) denotes the empirical distribution of the ith
symbols of the sequences in B, i.e.,
Qi(x) =
1
|B|
∑
xn∈B
1{xi = x}.
If we could also guarantee that Qi(x) = PX(x) for all x ∈ X ,
then (5) would become
zi(B) = argminz E[d(X, z)] (6)
In the light of this discussion, we want to design a codebook
and an encryption scheme so that, roughly speaking,
p(xn)
P[Xn ∈ B]
≈
1
|B|
(7)
and
Qi ≈ PX , i = 1, . . . , n. (8)
Figure 2 gives an example of (7) and (8). These ideas are
borne out in the proof of Theorem 1, which we now turn to.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In preparation for the proof of achievability, we first define
ε-typicality for a distribution P with finite support X :
T nε (P ) = {x
n ∈ Xn : |Qxn(x)− P (x)| < ε, ∀x ∈ X},
where Qxn(x) = 1n
∑
i 1{xi = x} is the empirical distribu-
tion, or “type”, of xn. Denote the set of types of sequences
xn ∈ Xn by Pn, and let Pnε ⊂ Pn denote the set of types
of those sequences xn ∈ Xn satisfying xn ∈ T nε (PX). For
P ∈ Pn, use |P | to denote the number of sequences of type
P . Finally, define the variational distance between distributions
P and Q by
‖P −Q‖ = sup
A
|P (A)−Q(A)|.
We will need a few lemmas. The first three lemmas will aid
us in asserting (8).
Lemma 1. Let P ∈ Pn. Form a matrix whose columns are
the sequences with type P , with the columns arranged in any
order. Then each of the rows of the matrix also has type P .
Proof: Any permutation applied to the rows of the matrix
simply permutes the columns. Therefore all the rows have
identical type. Since the matrix as a whole has type P , each
of the rows must be of type P as well.
Lemma 2 (see [3]). Suppose an urn U contains n balls, each
marked by an element of the set S, whose cardinality c is
finite. Let H be the distribution of k draws made at random
without replacement from U , and M be the distribution of k
draws made at random with replacement. Thus, H and M are
two distributions on Sk. Then
‖H −M‖TV ≤
ck
n
.
Thus, sampling without replacement is close in variational
distance to sampling with replacement (i.e, i.i.d.) provided the
sample size is small enough and the number of balls is large
enough. The rate at which the distance vanishes is important
to our problem. The next lemma is a lower bound on the size
of a type class.
Lemma 3 (see [4]). For P ∈ Pn,
|P | ≥ (n+ 1)−|X ||X |nH(P )
The final lemma concerns sufficient statistics in the context
of our measure of secrecy.
Lemma 4. Let X,Y , and Z be random variables that form a
markov chain X − Y − Z and let g be a function on A×Z .
Define two sets of functions, F = {f : X × Y → A} and
F ′ = {f : Y → A}. Then
min
f∈F
E[g(f(X,Y ), Z)] = min
f∈F ′
E[g(f(Y ), Z)].
Proof of Lemma 4: (≤) follows from F ′ ⊂ F . As for
(≥), we have
min
f∈F
E[g(f(X,Y ), Z)] =
∑
x,y
p(x, y)
∑
z
p(z|y)g(f∗(x, y), z)
=
∑
x,y
p(x, y)h(x, y)
=
∑
y
p(y)E[h(X,Y )|Y = y]
There exists x∗(y) such that
h(x∗(y), y) ≤ E[h(X,Y )|Y = y],
so we define f ∈ F ′ by f(y) = f∗(x∗(y), y). Then∑
y
p(y)E[h(X,Y )|Y = y] ≥
∑
y
p(y)h(x∗(y), y)
=
∑
y
p(y)
∑
z
p(z|y)g(f(y), z)
= E[g(f(Y ), Z)]
≥ min
f∈F ′
E[g(f(Y ), Z)]
Now we begin the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof of the converse is
straightforward: the converse for lossless source coding gives
us R > H(X), and Eve can always produce the constant
sequence (z∗, . . . , z∗) so that her distortion never exceeds
minz E[d(X, z)].
To begin the proof of achievability, fix PX , d(x, z), and
an increasing, unbounded sequence k(n). Let ε > 0 and
R > H(X). We will show that there exists a codebook
of 2nR sequences and an encryption scheme such that
P[Xn 6= Xˆn] < ε (9)
and
min
zn(m)
E [dn(Xn, zn(M))] > min
z
E[d(X, z)]− δ(ε) (10)
for sufficiently large n, where δ(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0.
Our codebook, the set of sequences that Alice encodes
uniquely, consists of the ε-typical sequences; thus, (9) is
satisfied by the law of large numbers. For blocklength n, we
want to consider a partition of the set of typical sequences into
equally sized subsets (or “bins”) of length k(n). A partition
will let us encode the message in two parts: in the first part,
we will reveal the identity of the bin that contains the source
sequence, and in the second part we will encrypt the location
within the bin by using the secret key to apply a one-time pad.
Effectively, the second part of the message will be useless to
Eve. We will denote the set of bins by B, so that each element
of B is a bin of k(n) sequences.
For a given partition of the typical sequences, the encoder
operates as follows. If Xn is typical and is the Lth sequence
in bin J , then transmit the pair (J, L ⊕K), where K is the
secret key and ⊕ is addition modulo k(n). If Xn is not typical,
transmit a random message.
In addition to requiring equal-sized bins, we further restrict
our attention to partitions in which each bin only contains
sequences of the same type2, and denote the set of bins of type
P by BP ; thus, B =
⋃
P∈Pn
ε
BP . This restriction addresses (7).
We claim that there exists a partition so that (10) is satisfied.
To do this, we first select a partition uniformly at random and
average the minimum attainable distortion over all partitions.
We use Eπ to indicate that expectation is being taken with
respect to a random partition. If (10) holds for the average,
then it must hold for at least one partition. This use of the
probabilistic method should be distinguished from “random
binning” that is often used in information theory. In random
binning, each sequence is assigned to a random bin; in
particular, the bin sizes are random, whereas here they are
of size k(n).
Selecting a partition at random is the same as drawing
typical sequences without replacement to fill equal-sized bins
of uniform type. This is also equivalent to first fixing a
partition B that meets the criteria, then for each P ∈ Pnε
randomly permuting the sequences in BP , selecting the |Pnε |
random permutations independently.
Denoting the left-hand side of (10) by D(n), we first use
2More precisely, we focus on partitions in which the number of bins in
violation is polynomial in n. The set of such partitions is nonempty since the
total number of types is polynomial in n (see [4]). The forthcoming analysis
is easily adjusted accordingly.
Lemma 4, then restrict attention to typical sequences to get
Eπ[D(n)] = Eπ
[
min
zn(j,l)
E [dn(Xn, zn(J, L⊕K))]
]
= Eπ
[
min
zn(j)
E [dn(Xn, zn(J))]
]
≥ Eπ
[
min
zn(j)
∑
xn∈Tn
ε
(PX )
p(xn)dn(xn, zn(J(xn)))
]
Note that although xn is deterministic when inside the summa-
tion above, the bin J(xn) that it belongs to is random because
we are considering a random partition. Summing over bins and
moving the summation outside, we have
Eπ [D(n)] ≥ Eπ
[
min
zn(j)
∑
B∈B
∑
xn∈B
p(xn)dn(xn, zn(J(xn))
]
= Eπ
[ ∑
B∈B
min
zn
∑
xn∈B
p(xn)dn(xn, zn)
]
Next, we sum over types as well, and use the fact that all
sequences of type P have probability
cP = |X |
n(H(P )+D(P ||PX ))
to get
Eπ [D(n)]
≥ Eπ
[ ∑
P∈Pn
ε
∑
B∈BP
min
zn
∑
xn∈B
p(xn)dn(xn, zn)
]
= Eπ
[ ∑
P∈Pn
ε
∑
B∈BP
cP min
zn
∑
xn∈B
dn(xn, zn)
]
Applying the separability of dn(xn, zn) and moving the ex-
pectation inside, we have
Eπ[D(n)]
≥ Eπ
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
P∈Pn
ε
∑
B∈BP
cP min
z
∑
xn∈B
d(xi, z)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
P∈Pn
ε
∑
B∈BP
cP Eπ
[
min
z
∑
xn∈B
d(xi, z)
]
(11)
Keep in mind that the elements of B are random codewords
because the partition is random.
Now we analyze the expectation in (11). Viewing BP as
a matrix with the constituent sequences forming the columns,
we denote the ith row by the random sequence (Y1, . . . , Y|P |).
Furthermore, we let (Y1, . . . , Yk(n)) denote the ith row of
B ∈ BP ; this is acceptable because the forthcoming analysis
is the same for each row of each bin. For ease of exposition,
we now refer to k(n) as simply k with the dependence on n
understood. Thus, we have
Eπ
[
min
z
∑
xn∈B
d(xi, z)
]
= k · Eπ
[
min
z
∑
x∈X
QY k(x)d(x, z)
]
where QY k is the type of Y k. Denoting the event
{Y k ∈ T kε (P )} by A, we have by the towering property
of expectation that
Eπ
[
min
z
∑
xn∈B
d(xi, z)
]
≥ k · Pπ[A] · Eπ
[
min
z
∑
x∈X
QY k(x)d(x, z)
∣∣∣A
]
. (12)
Focusing attention on the conditional expectation in (12), we
use the definition of typicality and the triangle inequality to
get
Eπ
[
min
z
∑
x∈X
QY k(x)d(x, z)
∣∣∣A
]
≥ Eπ
[
min
z
∑
x∈X
(PX(x) − 2ε)d(x, z)
∣∣∣A
]
= min
z
∑
x∈X
(PX(x) − 2ε)d(x, z)
≥ min
z
E[d(X, z)]− δ1(ε) (13)
where δ1(ε) = 2εminz
∑
x d(x, z) goes to zero as ε → 0
because the distortion measure d is bounded. Now we bound
P[A] in (12). We can assume that k(n) ∈ o(|X |nH(P )) without
loss of generality because Alice and Bob can simply ignore
extra secret key. Invoking Lemmas 1-3 to address (8), we have∥∥∥PY k −∏
k
P
∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥PY k −∏
k
QY |P |
∥∥∥ (14)
≤
|X | · k(n)
|P |
(15)
≤
|X | · k(n)
(n+ 1)−|X ||X |nH(P )
(16)
≤ ε (17)
for large enough n, where (14) follows from Lemma 1, (15)
follows from Lemma 2, and (16) follows from Lemma 3.
By the definition of variational distance and the law of large
numbers, (17) gives
Pπ[Y
k ∈ T nε (P )] ≥ P
∏
P [Y
k ∈ T nε (P )]− ε
≥ 1− 2ε (18)
for large enough n. The notation P∏P indicates that the
probability is evaluated with respect to the i.i.d. distribution∏
k P . Now, substituting (13) and (18) into (12), we have
Eπ
[
min
z
∑
xn∈B
d(xi, z)
]
≥ k · (min
z
E[d(X, z)]− δ2(ε)). (19)
Upon substituting (19) into (11), we conclude the proof by
noting that
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
P∈Pn
ε
∑
B∈BP
cP · k(n) = P[X
n ∈ T nε (PX)]
≥ 1− ε
for large enough n.
V. CONCLUSION
If an eavesdropper is trying to reconstruct an information
sequence in the Shannon cipher system, we have shown
that even small amounts of secret key enable the cipher to
cause maximal distortion in the eavesdropper’s estimate. Any
positive rate of secret key will suffice. However, the rate of
secret key, implying exponential growth in the number of
secret key assignments, is not even the right way to discuss the
theoretical limits. Corollary 1 shows that the proper question to
address is the tradeoff between secret key size and guaranteed
distortion, irrespective of the transmission length.
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